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Abstract 
The paper presents an alternative interpretation of the experimental data published by 
Kahneman and Tversky in their 1992 study "Advances in Prospect Theory”, which de-
scribes the Cumulative version of their Prospect Theory from 1979. It was assumed 
that, apart from the operations made during the initial stage of problem resolution, 
which Prospect Theory defines as Editing (here generalized as Mental Adaptation), 
other mental transformations such as Prospect Scaling (resulting from Focused Atten-
tion) and Logarithmic Perception of Financial Stimuli should be considered when ana-
lyzing the experimental data. This led to the design of an explicit, simple and symmetric 
solution without the use of the probability weighting function. The double S-type func-
tion obtained (the decision utility) resembles the utility curve specified by the Marko-
witz hypothesis (1952) and substitutes the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes introduced 
by Cumulative Prospect Theory. The results may signal a return to a description of 
people’s behavior that only relies on the utility-like function. 
 
Keywords: Prospect/Cumulative Prospect Theory, Markowitz Utility Hypothesis, Men-
tal Processes, Adaptation & Attention Focus, Aspiration Level 
 
JEL classification: D03, D81, C91 
1 Introduction  
The first approach based on a utility curve was proposed by Nicolas Bernoulli as early as 
1734. However, it was von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) who showed that the expected 
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utility hypothesis could be derived from several axioms which assumed that human decisions are 
rational. Since then, expected utility theory has become the dominant hypothesis in the economic 
thought of that time. As early as 1948, Friedman and Savage argued that the curvature of the util-
ity function varies in order to explain buying lottery tickets and insurances. Further developments 
were proposed by Markowitz (1952), who considered the shape of the utility function around the 
“customary” level of wealth. Later on, in Subjective Utility Theory (Savage, 1954) the classical 
definition of probability was replaced with the subjective one. 
However, the growing amount of experimental data indicated that no utility function 
could correctly explain human behavior. The most famous was the Allais paradox (1953). This 
led to the creation of several theories collectively referred to as Non-Expected Utility Theories. 
As Prospect Theory (1979) was met with objections from a mathematical point of view, an en-
hanced version was created - Cumulative Prospect Theory, CPT (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). 
Prospect Theory, and its extended version, gave rise to the concepts of the value function and the 
probability weighting function. The value function is supposed to evidence risk aversion for gain 
prospects and risk seeking for loss prospects, as well as a general aversion to losses. The prob-
ability weighting function is supposed to show the non-linear transformation of probabilities 
when making decisions, which would explain people’s willingness to participate in lotteries as 
well as their tendency towards less risky investments in the case of average probabilities. Pros-
pect Theory gave rise to new research trends. Much attention was focused on the probability 
weighting function (Camerer and Ho, 1994; Wu and Gonzalez, 1996, 1999; Prelec, 1998; Tver-
sky and Wakker, 1995).  
Prospect Theory has also met with criticism. Nwogugu (2006) has compiled a large col-
lection of objections and draws on a bibliography of 131 titles to support his claims. The author 
asserts that Prospect Theory was derived using improper methods and calculations and that it is 
not consonant with natural mental processes. Shu (1995) shows that it is wrong to assume the 
existence of probability weights. Neilson and Stowe (2002) demonstrate that Cumulative Pros-
pect Theory cannot simultaneously explain participation in lotteries and the Allais paradox. Bla-
vatsky (2005) claims that the theory does not explain the St. Petersburg paradox, a classic prob-
lem of decision making under conditions of risk. Levy and Levy (2002) state that their experi-
mental results negate Prospect Theory and confirm the Markowitz hypothesis.  
The present paper, too, is critical of Prospect Theory. However, it is not criticizing indi-
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vidual components or individual methodological assumptions, but is rather focused on analyzing 
the entire process of how the end results of the 1992 study were obtained from the experimental 
data. It has been stated that apart from the operations made at the initial stage of problem resolu-
tion, which Prospect Theory defines as Editing (in this study generalized as Mental Adaptation), 
any analysis of the experimental data should include other mental transformations such as Pros-
pect Scaling (resulting from Focused Attention) and Logarithmic Perception of Financial Stimuli. 
This assumption finds its explanation in psychology, in particular cognitive psychology, and in 
research at the sensory and neuronal levels. 
On the basis of the assumptions stated above and using exactly the same experimental da-
ta that were used to derive Cumulative Prospect Theory, an explicit, simple and symmetric solu-
tion was obtained without the use of the probability weighting function. A function was obtained 
which describes a direct relationship between the probability and relative certainty equivalent. 
The resulting curve (named the decision utility function) has a symmetric double S-type shape 
consistent with the Markowitz hypothesis (1952). More importantly, the decision utility function 
explains how people’s attitude towards risk depends on their state of mind and their aspiration 
levels. The explanation of risk attitudes given by the convex-concave-convex-concave shape of 
the decision utility function substitutes the fourfold pattern introduced by CPT. Summarizing the 
results presented in this study provide a basis of negating Prospect Theory as a theory that cor-
rectly describes how decisions are made under conditions of risk. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the mental transformations which 
form the basis of the derivation presented in the following part of the study. These transforma-
tions include Probability Weighting, Mental Adaptation, Prospect Scaling and Logarithmic Per-
ception of Financial Stimuli. Section 3 provides a solution using the Mental Adaptation and Pros-
pect Scaling transformations. Direct S-shaped relationships between the probability and relative 
certainty equivalents are obtained separately for gain and loss prospects. In Section 4, the results 
for gain and loss prospects are combined to produce a single solution named the “decision utility” 
function. The obtained curve strongly resembles the utility function specified by the Markowitz 
hypothesis (Section 5). Section 6 of the paper presents the derivation of the model for multi-
outcome lotteries. Section 7 presents the solution with the additional consideration of the Stimuli 
Logarithmic Transformation. Section 8 summarizes the study.  
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2 Review of Mental Transformations 
2.1. Transformation of Probabilities.  
That perception of probabilities is distorted is simultaneously one of the key assumptions 
and key results of Prospect Theory. The concept of decision weights was introduced into the first 
version of Prospect Theory in 1979. Even at that early stage, Kahneman and Tversky were stating 
that decision weights were not probabilities and did not comply with the axioms of probability. 
This led to serious mathematical objections (failure to comply with the First Order Stochastic 
Dominance). As a result, Rank-Dependent Expected Utility Theory (Quiggin) was developed as 
early as 1982 to remedy the shortcomings of its predecessor. The key concepts of that theory 
were later adopted by Cumulative Prospect Theory (Tversky, Kahneman, 1992). The axiomatiza-
tion is based on pretty complex topological models and Choquet integrals (Schmeidler, 1989, 
Wakker 1989, 1990; Kahneman and Tversky, 1992 and appendix to their publication).  
It is important to note that Kahneman and Tversky distinguish overestimation (often en-
countered when assessing the probability of rare events) and overweighting (as a feature of deci-
sion weights) (Prospect Theory, 1979). The latter phenomenon lacks psychological justification 
to the extent that the former has it (for instance by dint of insufficient knowledge). It is difficult 
to explain in psychological terms how a decision regarding an event whose probability is known 
seems to assume a different probability value. This is what the probability weighting function 
addresses. Furthermore no mechanism was posited to explain why this effect of probability trans-
formation only manifests itself at the moment a decision is made. A failure to distinguish be-
tween overestimation (which can be referred to as a kind of subjective view of events whose 
probabilities are not known) and overweighting (an artificial concept to explain the results of ex-
periments regarding events whose probabilities are known) leads to the commonly accepted view 
that the probability weighting function has a profound psychological justification. The next part 
of this study shows that the probability weighting function (i.e. the entire probability transforma-
tion concept) is not necessary to explain the results of the experiments conducted by Kahneman 
and Tversky. 
2.2. Mental Adaptation
3
 
Evolutionary adaptation was first described by British natural theologians John Ray 
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(1627–1705) and William Paley (1743–1805). The theory was later refined by Charles Darwin 
(1809–82). Peter Medawar, winner of the Nobel Prize for Medicine and Physiology in 1960, de-
scribes the term as “a process allowing organisms to change to become better suited for survival 
and reproduction in their given habitat”. The Oxford Dictionary of Science defines adaptation as 
“any change in the structure or functioning of an organism that makes it better suited to its envi-
ronment”. More definitions can be found in Rappaport (1971) and Williams (1966). Summariz-
ing “adaptation can refer to a trait that confers some fitness on an animal, but it also represents 
the process by which that trait has come about” (Greenberg, 2010).  
 “Neural or sensory adaptation is a change over time in the responsiveness of the sensory 
system to a constant stimulus. More generally, the term refers to a temporary change of the neural 
response to a stimulus as the result of preceding stimulation”. This Wikipedia definition is close 
to those met in academic texts: “Adaptation in the context of sensation refers to the fact that a 
prolonged and uniform sensory stimulus eventually ceases to give rise to a sensory message” 
(Medawar, 1983, more in Laughlin, 1989 and Hildebrandt, 2010). The best example of neural 
adaptation is eye adaptation. Similar mechanisms are well attested for smell, temperature, taste, 
pain and touch (Gregory, Colman, 1995, Medawar, 1983). 
The definitions presented so far all assume that it is the living organism which adapts to 
changing environmental conditions. However, from the standpoint of a human being, adaptation 
may be seen as a process of changing the external world to suit its requirements. This was best 
expressed by Leakey (1981) as follows: “Animals adapt themselves to environment, hominids 
adapt environment to themselves using tools, language and complex cooperative social struc-
tures”. Mutual human - environment interaction was described by the famous Swiss psychologist 
Jean Piaget, who “considers in fact intelligence rising from mental adaptation, where the adapta-
tion is the equilibration of the action of an organism on the environment (assimilation) and of the 
action of the environment on the organism (accommodation)” (Maniezzo, Roffilli, 2005).  
In the author’s opinion, the term “mental adaptation” is best expressed as “the state of not 
thinking about certain phenomena”. This definition follows the Sulavik (1997) paper on mental 
adaptation to death in the case of professional rescuers, although it can easily be extended to cov-
er many other situations like stress, major illness, bereavement, financial loss, immigration (Ja-
sinskaja-Lahti, 2006), disasters (Leon, 2004), and even space travel (NASA). It should be borne 
in mind that mental adaptation occurs in positive situations as well – financial windfalls, profes-
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sional achievements, falling in love etc. “Hedonic treadmill” is another term for mental adapta-
tion coined by Brickman and Campbell (1971) “to describe the now widely accepted notion that 
though people continue to accrue experiences and objects that make them happy – or unhappy – 
their overall level of well-being tends to remain fairly static.” (Mochon et al., 2008, also Kahne-
man, 1999). There are several other meanings of adaptation encountered in the literature (e.g. 
social adaptation). A wide coverage of hedonic adaptation examples is given by Frederick and 
Loewenstein (1999). Nevertheless, most of them have a common feature, viz. they signify a shift 
of either the organism’s structure or its perception system to a new level. As a result, people (and 
animals) become better suited to external conditions, do not sense any more external stimuli, and 
cease to think about certain phenomena.  
2.3. Prospect Scaling  
Prospect Scaling, as the mental transformation resulting from focusing attention, is of key 
significance for deriving the solution presented in the following part of this study. The spring-
board for discussion is the Weber law4, one of the fundamental laws of psychophysics. The law 
states that the Just Noticeable Difference is a constant proportion of the initial stimulus magni-
tude7. It follows from the Weber law that the same change in stimulus (for instance 0.2 kg) can be 
strongly felt, slightly noticed or not perceived at all depending on the magnitude of the initial 
stimulus. It further follows that an unambiguous and absolute perception level of a specific stimu-
lus change cannot be determined, as this depends on the situational context. This applies equally 
to financial stimuli. The human sensory system adapts itself to financial quantities, just as it does 
to physical ones. This means that when looking at financial prospects (projects, investments, lot-
teries etc.), the reference value (size of the investment, major lottery prize) becomes a value of 
reference in the entire mental process, causing an absolute amount of money (say 10 USD) to be 
relevant (for instance when shopping) or irrelevant (when buying a house), i.e. depending on the 
context. This conclusion constitutes a fundamental difference to Prospect Theory, which regards 
profits and losses in absolute terms, and tries to draw a value function as a function of absolute 
amounts of money.  
The mechanism responsible for this mental transformation is attention – one of the most 
thoroughly examined concepts in cognitive psychology. According to one definition, attention is 
the process of selectively concentrating on a single perceived object, source of stimulation, or 
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topic from among the many available options (Nęcka, 2007). The existence of attention is indis-
pensable on account of a living organism’s need to adapt to the demands of the environment 
(Broadbent, 1958) and on account of the finite ability of the brain to process information (Dun-
can, Humphreys, 1989). Several models of attention division are discussed, especially in relation 
to Focused Attention. The entire mechanism can be explained by such aspects of attention as Se-
lection and Gain (Amplification) Control, the existence of which is evidenced by attention re-
search at the neuronal level. Others, including Hillyard et al. (1998), state that attention has a gain 
(amplification) control character which aims to increase the signal to noise ratio of the stimuli on 
which attention is focused. The signal of most interest to the brain is maintained at a stable and 
optimal level as a result. Further, it is assumed that the amplification control mechanism operates 
at a higher mental level as well. This leads to problems differing in scale being perceived as 
equally significant when attention is focused. It is not difficult to conclude that the mathematical 
equivalent of amplification is homothety or scaling. 
The arguments cited indicate that the attention focused on a specific payment in the con-
ducted experiments seems to be a natural effect that has to be factored into any analysis of the 
results. This is especially the case under experimental conditions as those surveyed are remuner-
ated for their participation; it means they are paid to focus their whole attention on the analyzed 
problems. The assumption that the value of a prospect payment becomes a reference value in the 
conducted experiments leads to a completely different solution than that which Prospect Theory 
proposes. 
2.4. Logarithmic Perception of Financial Stimuli 
Logarithmic perception of financial stimuli is the last mental transformation significant to 
deriving the results presented in the following part of the study. Here, the reference point for dis-
cussion is also a fundamental psychophysical law, viz. the Weber-Fechner law, which concerns 
the logarithmic perception of stimuli.5 Logarithmic perception of financial figures is not consid-
ered in Prospect Theory despite there being known examples of logarithmic and exponential 
functions being used in financial applications.6 Instead, the authors of Prospect Theory used the 
relationship introduced by Stevens (1957), who stated that stimuli perception was determined by 
a power function. That type of function was included in Prospect Theory to describe the value 
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function. Surprisingly the difference in approach turns out to be insignificant since both functions 
(logarithmic and power) have an almost identical shape for low x-coordinate values.7 This leads 
to the conclusion that the perception of monetary amounts used in Kahneman and Tversky’s ex-
periments could be equally well described using a logarithmic curve. Some arguments in favor of 
a logarithmic perception of financial stimuli are provided by other results presented in CPT, 
which states that mixed prospects are accepted when gains are at least twice as high as losses. 
This effect may be easily explained by noticing that in logarithmic terms, a 100% profit corre-
sponds to a 50% loss. The experimental results presented in the CPT article also show that, for a 
probability of 0.5, the certainty equivalents appear to be around 0.418 of the payment value irre-
spective of the type of prospect (gain or loss), the presence or absence of riskless components, or 
the payment amount after deducting the riskless components. This effect can be interpreted as 
being a result of a logarithmic perception of payment value. A very strong argument in support of 
a logarithmic, rather than a “power”, perception of monetary amounts is given in Section 6 of this 
paper.  
3 Solution Using Mental Adaptation & Prospect Scaling Trans-
formations 
This section contains the alternative analysis of the experimental data presented by Kah-
neman and Tversky in their 1992 paper. This analysis is based on the assumption that apart from 
Mental Adaptation Transformation, Prospect Scaling should be also considered when analyzing 
the experimental data. It is here assumed that the reference values for the certainty equivalents 
under examination were the prospect payments (outcomes) themselves. 
During the experiment conducted by Kahneman and Tversky, certainty equivalents CE 
were collected for the prospects of payment $Pmin with probability 1 - p or payment $Pmax with 
probability p, where: 
    min maxP P<  (3.1) 
The payment $Pmin should be interpreted as the riskless component. The experimental re-
sults are presented in Table 3.3 of the original CPT publication (1992). It is assumed that there is 
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a function F such that:  
 ( )  ,  ,  min maxCE F P P p=  (3.2) 
The variables CE’ and Pmax’ are now introduced to account for the mental adaptation 
process. These are a Pmin translation of CE and P: 
 ’    minCE CE P= −  (3.3) 
 ’    max minP P P= −  (3.4) 
If Pmin = 0, we refer to the prospect as having no riskless component and then CE’ = CE 
and P’ = Pmax. Introducing these new variables presupposes the existence of a function G such 
that: 
 ( )’  ’,  CE G P p=  (3.5) 
At this point (3.5) is transformed in such a way that probability p, and not CE’, becomes 
the value to be determined. Due to the fact that CE’ is monotonic with respect to p, it may be 
assumed that there is an inverse function H such that: 
 ( )  ’,  ’p H CE P=  (3.6) 
In order to take Prospect Scaling into account, it is assumed that the value of payment P’ 
becomes the reference value for the certainty equivalent CE’ and that the equivalent values are 
scaled by a coefficient 1/P’. As a result, a variable r = CE’ / P’ is introduced as the relative cer-
tainty equivalent with a value in the range [0,1]. This also supports the existence of the following 
D function defined over the range [0,1]:  
 ( ) ( )  ’ / ’   p D CE P D r= =  (3.7) 
For example, for the specific values listed in Table 3.3 of Kahneman and Tversky’s paper, 
the relationships D(9/50) = 0.10, D(21/50) = 0.50, and D(37/50) = 0.90 are obtained for the pros-
pect (0, 50), and the relationships D(14/100) = 0.05, D(25/100) = 0.25 are obtained for the pros-
pect (0, 100). For the prospect with the riskless component (50, 150), the relationships D((64-
50)/100) = D(14/100) = 0.05, D((72.5-50)/100) = D(22.5/100) = 0.25, and D((86-50)/100) = 
D(36/100) = 0.5, are obtained after the Mental Adaptation Transformation. 
The obtained values are plotted on the graph p = D(r) and approximated using the least 
squares method with the assistance of the Cumulative Beta Distribution Ir(a, b) (i.e. regularized 
incomplete beta function). This particular function was selected because it is defined in the do-
main [0,1] and because of the extraordinary flexibility the two parameters α and β give its shape. 
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Approximations were made separately for the loss (P < 0)9 and gain (P > 0) prospects. The results 
are presented in Figure 3.1.  
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Figure 3.1 Transformed experimental points and approximation p = D(r) using cumulative beta distribution 
function for loss prospects (left) and for gain prospects (right). 
The approximations obtained for the function p = D(r) for loss and gain prospects allow 
the following conclusions to be drawn:  
1. The function p = D(r) is  S-shaped for both loss and gain prospects. 
2. The respective values of the parameters α and β are 2.24 and 3.22 for gain prospects and 1.59 
and 2.09 for loss prospects. The disparity between the parameters α and β in both cases confirms 
the asymmetry of the function D(r) with respect to the center point (p, r) = (1/2, 1/2).  
3. The intersection of the approximation functions p = D(r) with the straight line p = r occurs 
when r has a value of approximately 0.25. This value is called the aspiration level, as (in case of 
gains) the risk seeking attitude is present for lower values of the relative outcome r, and risk 
aversion is present for greater values of r. This implies a change of attitude to risk at the aspira-
tion level, which is in accordance with the generally accepted notion of this term. The pattern for 
losses is reversed.  
Assuming Focused Attention and the resulting Prospect Scaling Transformation led to a 
different solution than that presented by Prospect Theory. First of all, the entire description has 
been reduced to the relationship p = D(r), and the value function and the probability weighting 
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function have disappeared altogether as they are not needed to describe the experimental results. 
Secondly, the relative certainty equivalent r is directly transformed into probability p (and vice 
versa). This means that in order to determine the certainty equivalent CE for probability p, the 
value of r need only be read directly from the graph (Figure 3.2) and multiplied by the value of 
payment P’. For example, r = 0.75 for p = 0.95. Hence, CE’ = 75 for P’ = 100 (the value obtained 
experimentally was 78). In case of prospects with riskless components, e.g. (50, 150), the value 
of the certainty equivalent CE = CE’ + Pmin = 75 + 50 = 125 (the value 128 was obtained in the 
experiment).  
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Figure 3.2 Relationship p = D(r) for gain prospects with plotted lines p = 0.05 and p = 0.95. 
Finally, nonlinear changes of the certainty equivalents (especially within high and low 
probability ranges) can be presented simply (see Figure 3.2). Increasing probability from 0 to 
0.05 causes the relative certainty equivalent r to increase from 0 to 0.11. Increasing probability 
from 0.95 to 1 causes the relative certainty equivalent r to increase from 0.75 to 1. A similar ex-
planation could be presented for loss prospects. 
4 Combining Gains and Losses 
The solutions obtained so far comprise two p = D(r) functions with one describing losses, 
the other gains. The loss and gain prospects need to be scaled before the two functions can be 
presented together. The simplest assumption has been adopted, similar to the Prospect Theory 
approach when defining the value function, namely: 
 p nD Dλ=  (4.1) 
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where Dp is the curve for gains, and Dn is the curve for losses. In order to determine the scale 
factor λ, Kahneman and Tversky conducted additional experiments, the results of which are pre-
sented in Table 3.6 of the original publication. The obtained results indicate that the mixed pros-
pects are accepted if the profit is at least twice as great as the loss. An exact ratio value of 2.07 as 
the mean value of Θ resulting from problems 1-6 in the Table 3.6 (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1992), is assumed for further calculations. Taking into account that Dp(1) = 1, and Dn(0.483) ≈ 
0.589 we obtain: 
 1 / 0.589 1.70λ = ≈  (4.2) 
Now, let us present this result graphically. Figure 4.1a shows functions Dp and Dn (the lat-
ter multiplied by λ). It is evident that Dn is now equal to 1 for r = 0.483, and that the loss and gain 
curves are scaled.  Figure 4.1b presents both functions in different form. The function Dn for the 
loss prospects is presented within a range of [-1,0], and the scale factor λ has a value of -1.70. 
 
Figure 4.1 Functions Dp(r) and Dn(r) presented together on a single graph. (Left) within a range of r [0,1]; 
function Dn(r) multiplied by the constant λ = 1.70, (right) function Dn(r) within a range of r [-1,0] and multi-
plied by the constant λ = -1.70. 
The question of how to interpret the curve presented in Figure 4.1b may now be posed. 
We call this decision utility and it needs to be stated that this curve presents the sum total of all 
the knowledge that has come out of Prospect Theory and its cumulative version.  
1. The fourfold pattern of risk attitudes, which was presented by CPT and confirmed in other stu-
dies, is evident: 
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a). in case of gain prospects, the curve is convex for probabilities below 30% (correspond-
ing to risk taking), and becomes concave for probabilities above 30% (corresponding to 
risk aversion); 
b). in case of loss prospects, the curve is concave for probabilities below 20% (corre-
sponding to risk aversion), and becomes convex for probabilities above 20% (correspond-
ing to risk seeking). 
2. The convex-concave-convex-concave shape of the decision utility substitutes therefore the 
fourfold pattern of risk attitudes described by CPT. 
3. The function’s more linear shape for loss prospects confirms the results of other studies that 
people’s attitude to risk for losses is rather neutral in nature10. 
4. Both parts of the curve (for loss and gain prospects) describe the results of experiments without 
having to resort to the probability weighting function.  
5. Both parts of the curve are scaled, which means that mixed prospects can also be analyzed. 
5 The Markowitz Utility Function Hypothesis 
In 1952, Markowitz published an article “The Utility of Wealth” presenting his hypothesis 
on the shape of the utility function. While this article was known to Kahneman and Tversky, they 
believed that neither this nor any other utility function could explain certain psychological ex-
periments. This led to the development of Prospect Theory as an alternative to classical economic 
theories based on utility functions. That the decision utility curve so closely resembles the curve 
presented in the Markowitz article (Figure 5.1) is highly surprising given the result was obtained 
using the same experimental data used to derive Cumulative Prospect Theory.  
Markowitz specified the utility function as follows: The utility function has three inflec-
tion points. The middle inflection point is defined to be at the "customary" level of wealth. The 
first inflection point is below customary wealth and the third inflection point is above it. The dis-
tance between the inflection points is a non-decreasing function of wealth. The curve is mono-
tonically increasing but bounded from above and from below; it is first concave, then convex, 
then concave, and finally convex. We may also assume that |U(-X)| > U(X), X > o (where X = o 
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is customary wealth).
11  
 
Figure 5.1 The shape of the utility function according to the Markowitz hypothesis of 1952. 
It is clear that all but one of the requirements of the utility curve expressed by Markowitz 
in his hypothesis are met by the curve presented in Figure 4.1b. The decision utility curve has 
three inflection points right where Markowitz predicted they would be. The function is mono-
tonically increasing and is limited from the top and from the bottom. Concavities and convexities 
occur in the order assumed by Markowitz. The condition related to the function value for X val-
ues having opposite signs is also met (which Figure 4.1a verifies). The only condition not met is 
that the distances between the inflection points depend on people’s wealth. Markowitz noted: If 
the chooser were rather rich, my guess is that he would act as if his first and third inflection 
points were farther from the origin. Conversely, if the chooser were rather poor, I should expect 
him to act as if his first and third inflection points were closer to the origin. In the Markowitz 
hypothesis the position of inflection points changes because the w (wealth)-axis is expressed in 
absolute terms. This differs from the decision utility curve, where the r-axis is expressed relative 
to the size of the prospect.  
There is no reason to regard this approach as being in any way anomalous. People com-
monly say “I have gained 15% on my stock investments” rather than “I have gained 5% of my 
wealth on my stock investments”. It is clear enough that the former sentence assumes the value of 
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the stock investment as the reference for gain/losses considerations. Moreover, according to 
Thaler (1985), people keep mentally separate accounts, so that investments and expenditures are 
considered as separate parts rather than as a whole. As a result, instead of saying “I have lost 2% 
of my wealth on my stock and real estate investments” people typically consider “I have lost 5% 
on my house but I have gained 15% on stocks” despite the fact that the absolute values of stock 
and house investments may differ substantially. It follows that the decision utility applies for each 
separate account, albeit with different reference values established by the attention focus. This 
may mean that people could be risk seeking and risk averse at the same time depending on the 
status and prospects of each account.  
Markowitz’s assumption that the shape of the utility curve corresponds with the value of 
wealth precluded his curve (however tempting its shape) from being able to explain experiments 
on financial payments which were not directly related to the wealth of the people being studied. 
This is what led Kahneman and Tversky to reject the Markowitz hypothesis and develop Prospect 
Theory. The result presented here, however, may signal a return to an approach based on the util-
ity-like function and lead to a negation of Prospect Theory. Accepting that gains and losses need 
not be considered in relation to wealth, but to any other value depending on where a person’s 
attention is focused, is all that it would take to come back to this earlier concept. The payoff is a 
simpler and more accurate description of people’s behavior. 
6 The Model for Multi-Outcome Lotteries 
Derivation of the model for multiple outcomes is straightforward. It is assumed that for 
each lottery with more than two outcomes in the range [0,1], there exists an equivalent lottery 
with two outcomes of 0 and 1 only. The probability of winning this equivalent lottery can be de-
termined as follows. Each outcome ri of the multi-outcome lottery can be considered the certainty 
equivalent of a lottery, whose outcomes are 0 and 1, and whose probability of winning is 
( )'i ip D r= . The joint probability of winning the equivalent lottery is therefore '
1
n
i i
i
p p
=
∑ , which 
leads to:  
 ( )
1
n
eq i i
i
p p D r
=
=∑  (6.1) 
This peq probability is called the equivalent probability of the multi-outcome lottery. The 
 16 
relative certainty equivalent of the multi-outcome lottery can be found by inverting (6.1): 
 ( )1
1
n
i i
i
r D p D r−
=
 
=  
 
∑  (6.2) 
Please note that (6.1) and (6.2) do not require the concept of probability weighting in ei-
ther its basic or cumulative form. Please also note the strong resemblance of the equivalent prob-
ability formula (6.1) to the Expected Utility valuation. In fact, the decision utility model follows 
Expected Utility Theory with a transformed outcome domain. Decision utility is expressed in 
terms of probability and does not require any hypothetical “utils” to describe people’s behavior. 
To put it more straightforwardly, the equivalent probability is the decision utility. Once accus-
tomed to this seemingly strange notion, everything can be considered at the basic probability the-
ory level. 
A more detailed analysis of the model for multi-outcome lotteries is presented in Kontek 
(2010a). It is enough to state here that the decision utility model presents similar results to Cumu-
lative Prospect Theory in the case of two-outcome lotteries. However, the results differ for multi-
outcome lotteries. It is shown that CPT can make some “strange” predictions for a simple multi-
outcome lottery. This result is largely inexplicable and calls the correctness and applicability of 
this theory into question. The result obtained using the decision utility function is not similarly 
disadvantaged. This is because it uses the classical notion of probability. 
7 Including Logarithmic Perception of Financial Stimuli  
An important objection raised by one of the referees was that the proposed model fails to 
interpret the following case. Let us suppose that Pmin = 0 and p = 0.5. The model implies that 
CE/P is constant. The referee does not think that this is realistic, as he expects this ratio to de-
crease as P becomes very large. For instance, somebody may well be indifferent between a cer-
tain $40 and a 50% chance of winning $100, but will definitely prefer a certain $40 million to a 
50% chance of winning $100 million.  
We note first that (quite surprisingly) Cumulative Prospect Theory likewise fails to ex-
plain this type of case. According to this theory, the weight w associated with a probability of p is 
constant. Cumulative Prospect Theory then assumes the value function to be described by a pow-
er function that conforms to Stevens Law, i.e.: 
 ( )v x xα=  (7.1) 
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It follows that the indifference in the first case is described as: 
 ( )0.5 100 40w α α=  (7.2) 
Multiplying both sides of (7.2) by a constant 1,000,000α we obtain  
 ( )0.5 100,000,000 40,000,000w α α=  (7.3) 
which also describes indifference in the second case. This means that increasing the prospect size 
does not change the preference, according to Cumulative Prospect Theory (in contrast to common 
belief). This preference change can only be explained by assuming a value function of decreasing 
elasticity, whereas the power function is of constant elasticity (Scholten & Read, 2010). They 
propose using the logarithmic function v(x) = 1/a log(1 + a x) in order to explain similar observa-
tions. This is exactly the function which appeared in the first version of this paper, although in a 
slightly different context. It follows that the following formula should be used to calculate the 
perceived relative outcome when considering bigger amounts of money: 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
min
max min
u CE u P
r
u P u P
−
=
−
 (7.4) 
where u denotes the perception utility. As has been shown, this utility cannot be described using a 
power function, as postulated by Cumulative Prospect Theory. A logarithmic function is there-
fore preferred. Please note that: 
 
( )
( )
( )
( )
ln 1 40 ln 1 40,000,000
ln 1 100 ln 1 100,000,000
a a
a a
+ +
<
+ +
 (7.5) 
meaning that the perceived relative outcome in the second case is greater than in the first one,  
and corresponding to the risk aversion part of the decision utility function. This explains the pref-
erence for a sure payment in the case of a million dollar lottery.  
Parameterization of the perception utility is, however, highly unlikely using the original 
data set of Tversky and Kahneman as $400 is the maximum payment they consider. This task is 
therefore left for further research using other experimental data. In any case, a linear perception 
utility can safely be assumed for small monetary amounts as in the derivation presented in Sec-
tion 3.  
8 Summary 
The article presents an alternative interpretation of the experimental data published by 
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Kahneman and Tversky in their 1992 paper "Advances in Prospect Theory". Mental transforma-
tions, crucial to deriving the results, were discussed in the introduction section. Later, the solution 
was derived without using the probability weighting function. The obtained function has a double 
S-type shape that strongly resembles the utility curve specified by the Markowitz hypothesis 
(1952). The presented decision utility function shows that risk seeking appears for relative out-
comes below the aspiration level. On the other hand risk aversion is present for relative outcomes 
greater than aspiration level. This pattern is reversed for losses. The explanation of risk attitudes 
given by the convex-concave-convex-concave shape of the decision utility function substitutes 
the fourfold pattern introduced by CPT. The paper shows that the perception utility should be 
described using the logarithmic function, rather than the power function as assumed by Cumula-
tive Prospect Theory. This enables the change of preferences with increasing prospect sizes to be 
explained. The results presented provide a basis for negating Prospect Theory as the theory which 
best describes decision-making under conditions of risk and may foreshadow a return to describ-
ing people’s behavior solely by using utility functions. The main problem with Prospect Theory 
is the probability weighting concept, which makes this theory so difficult to apply to more com-
plex applications (for instance multi-outcome lotteries). Coming back to the classical notion of 
probability should make it possible to use it to model real world conditions. 
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